Where each of the 27 EU governments stands on scanning private messages, with the document behind every entry. Updated after every Council meeting and every public statement we can verify.
A blocking minority against mass scanning is 2.1 points short, and three governments can close it. 9 governments representing 32.9 % of the EU population are on record against mandatory scanning of private messages. That is below the 35 % needed to block a Council vote; the vote in question is the Council’s next decision on this file, the endorsement of whatever the trilogues produce, on a date not yet set, and the sum assumes that governments vote as they have spoken. Germany, with 18.47 % on its own, would take the group to 51.3 %: its public line since October 2025 rejects suspicionless scanning, but the instruction its negotiators have carried since June 2026 does not oppose mandatory detection where it supplements voluntary scanning. Belgium (2.63 %) and Portugal (2.38 %) have declared nothing decisive, and either one alone would also close the 2.1 point gap. Slovenia (0.47 %), reclassified as unclear on 9 September 2026, could not close it alone. The sixth political trilogue, on 29 September 2026, agreed on the tasks of the EU Centre, as the Parliament confirmed, and in principle on detection orders for public content, according to press reports, but not on scanning private messages; no date has been confirmed for the next round, and the Council does not vote in trilogues.
Last checkedWhat changed since the last check: Slovenia moved from Against to Unclear. Its recorded position, a ministry statement of 2 October 2025, was made under the previous government. The government confirmed on 4 June 2026 has not stated a line, and on 10 June its delegation described its scrutiny reservation on the presidency compromise, which includes mandatory detection for public content, as positive. Until it speaks, the count is 9 governments firmly against, 32.9 % of the population, 2.1 points below the 35 % that blocks a Council vote. The three that can close the gap are unchanged: Germany, Belgium, Portugal.
The 27, at a glance
Click a country for its page: quote, receipt, votes, who decides. Figures are computed from the 27 records, last checked 11 October 2026.
Bulgariasince 12 Nov 2025
Croatiasince 12 Nov 2025
Cyprussince 12 Sep 2025
Denmarksince 26 Jun 2026
Francesince 23 Jul 2026
Greecesince 26 Jun 2026
Hungarysince 17 Jun 2026
Irelandsince 2 Jul 2026
Latviasince 10 Jun 2026
Lithuaniasince 12 Nov 2025
Maltasince 17 Jun 2026
Romaniasince 26 Jun 2026
Spainsince 10 Jun 2026
Swedensince 10 Jun 2026
Free to reuse under CC BY 4.0. Data: JSON · CSV. Found a mistake? Tell us.
How to read it. The position column answers one question: does this government accept that providers may be ordered to scan everyone’s private messages? Votes on the two Council texts are listed separately, because a government can oppose mandatory scanning and still vote for the voluntary regime. Every row links to the document it rests on.
The 27 governments
Alphabetical. Position on mandatory scanning of private messages, two Council votes, and the receipt.
| Country | Mandatory scanning of private messages | Council votes | Receipt | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AUTAustria2.03 % of EU population | Againstsince 9 Oct 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Government decision reported by NEOS, a governing party, 9 Oct 2025 | The Nationalrat’s EU subcommittee adopted a four-party opinion on the file in November 2022. Voted for the voluntary-only mandate in November 2025 and still calls detection orders critical in Council (June 2026). |
“Austria will not agree to EU chat control; we have made sure of that with a government decision.”NEOS press release, 9 October 2025, translated from German | ||||
| BELBelgium2.63 % of EU population | Unclearsince 8 Oct 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026abstained | Interior Minister Bernard Quintin, Chamber committee record, 8 Oct 2025 | Officials could 'in principle' back the mandatory text in Council (Sept 2025) while the coalition disagreed at home. N-VA says Belgium abstained on the mandate; others say it voted yes. Abstained on Chat Control 1.0 in July 2026. |
“The government's position has not yet been settled.”Chamber of Representatives, Interior Committee, 8 October 2025, translated from French | ||||
| BGRBulgaria1.42 % of EU population | Supportssince 12 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council working party minutes, 12 Nov 2025, via netzpolitik.org | Explicitly supported the mandatory text (Sept 2025). With Spain and Hungary asked in November 2025 for a duty to detect at least in public spaces. Since the change of government on 8 May 2026 the delegation has entered a scrutiny reservation on the detection compromise (10 June 2026) and nothing more; the label rests on the earlier documents until Sofia speaks. |
“In principle in support of the measure proposed by the Belgian presidency, but with a working balance that guarantees the effective exercise of law-enforcement powers.”Ministry of the Interior, answer to an access-to-information request, 9 July 2024, translated from Bulgarian | ||||
| HRVCroatia0.86 % of EU population | Supportssince 12 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Interior Minister Davor Bozinovic, ministry statement, 14 Oct 2025 | In Council it was clearly disappointed when detection orders were dropped (Nov 2025) and wants the widest scope: known and new material and grooming (June 2026). |
“This regulation does not provide for any mass surveillance of communications. The European Union wants this to become mandatory, not voluntary.”Ministry of the Interior, 14 October 2025, translated from Croatian | ||||
| CYPCyprus0.22 % of EU population | Supportssince 12 Sep 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council working party minutes, 12 Sep 2025, via netzpolitik.org | No public national statement found. Held the presidency in the first half of 2026 and drafted the compromise that mixes voluntary scanning with targeted detection orders. |
“Cyprus agrees to the compromise proposal and supports everything that makes citizens safer. The draft regulation has the highest priority.”Council working party, 12 September 2025, as recorded in the German cable, translated | ||||
| CZECzechia2.42 % of EU population | Againstsince 25 Jul 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025noChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Interior Minister Lubomir Metnar, 25 Jul 2026 (Echo24) | Both the Fiala and the Babis governments are on record. Prague voted against the mandate over encryption, backed Chat Control 1.0 in July 2026 and says it has no position yet on the permanent law. On 17 Sep 2026 the Chamber’s European Affairs Committee rejected any general content detection and any blanket undermining of end-to-end encryption. |
“We do not consider the Commission's original proposal acceptable; it would lead to disproportionate interference with private communication.”Interior Minister Lubomir Metnar, 25 July 2026, translated from Czech
| ||||
| DNKDenmark1.32 % of EU population | Supportssince 26 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council minutes, 26 Jun 2026 (wants detection negotiated now), via netzpolitik.org | As presidency it proposed mandatory scanning including client-side scanning, dropped the orders on 30 October 2025 for lack of a majority, and in June 2026 wanted detection negotiated right away. |
“I'm glad that the member states have finally agreed on a way forward that includes a number of obligations for providers of communication services to combat the spread of child sexual abuse material.”Justice Minister Peter Hummelgaard, Council press release, 26 November 2025
| ||||
| ESTEstonia0.30 % of EU population | Againstsince 19 Feb 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Ministers Kristina Kallas and Igor Taro, ERR, 19 Feb 2026 | Parliament's EU committee voted unanimously against the mandatory text. Wants encrypted communication kept out and calls grooming detection too unreliable (June 2026). |
“Estonia has submitted its position. Estonia's position is that we do not support this.”Minister Kristina Kallas, ERR, 19 February 2026, translated from Estonian | ||||
| FINFinland1.24 % of EU population | Againstsince 17 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council minutes, 17 Jun 2026 (rejects mandatory detection in private communication), via netzpolitik.org | Parliament's committees set the line. Helsinki backed the voluntary-only mandate on condition that encryption is not broken, and in June 2026 accepted mandatory detection only outside private messages. |
“The proposal would mean large-scale mass surveillance of communications; the measures would target all communications on the services in question.”Eduskunta Transport and Communications Committee statement, 23 October 2024, translated from Finnish | ||||
| FRAFrance15.18 % of EU population | Supportssince 23 Jul 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Statement by France, Council voting result 12382/26, 23 Jul 2026 | Welcomed detection orders and client-side scanning in September 2025 and says there is no room for negotiation on a broad scope for voluntary scanning (June 2026). |
“They express their serious concern regarding the amendment adopted by the European Parliament on the exclusion of encrypted communications. The wording used is very broad.”Statement by France annexed to the Council vote, 23 July 2026 | ||||
| DEUGermany18.47 % of EU population | Conditionalsince Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Federal government press conference and Justice Ministry, 8 Oct 2025 | Its refusal sank the mandatory text in October 2025. Since then Berlin pushes the widest scope for voluntary scanning and, per its June 2026 instruction, does not oppose mandatory detection if it complements voluntary scanning. |
“Suspicionless chat control must be taboo in a state under the rule of law. Private communication must never be placed under general suspicion.”Justice Minister Stefanie Hubig, 8 October 2025, translated from German | ||||
| GRCGreece2.30 % of EU population | Supportssince 26 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council minutes, 10 and 26 Jun 2026, via netzpolitik.org | No public national statement found. Wanted detection negotiated now rather than after the agreed parts (June 2026). |
“Greece entered a positive scrutiny reservation on the presidency's detection compromise and, with Germany, France and Latvia, urged speed.”Council minutes of 10 and 26 June 2026, as recorded in the German cables | ||||
| HUNHungary2.11 % of EU population | Supportssince 17 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026no | Council minutes, 10 and 17 Jun 2026, via netzpolitik.org | New Tisza government since May 2026 kept the broad-scope line with France. In July 2026 it was the only government to vote against Chat Control 1.0; no reason was published, while the prime minister defended the interim rules at home. |
“Voluntariness alone as the sole concept is too little. Excluding voluntary measures in end-to-end encrypted communication is a red line.”Council working party, 12 November 2025, as recorded in the German cable, translated | ||||
| IRLIreland1.20 % of EU population | Supportssince 2 Jul 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Justice Minister Jim O'Callaghan, Council press release, 2 Jul 2026 | Supported the mandatory text in September 2025. Holds the presidency since July 2026 and chairs the 29 September trilogue; its justice minister calls the inability to intercept encrypted services a matter of considerable concern. |
“Protecting children is our duty. The position agreed by the Council today paves the way for online service providers to resume their efforts to detect child sexual abuse online.”Justice Minister Jim O'Callaghan, 2 July 2026 | ||||
| ITAItaly13.19 % of EU population | Againstsince 26 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025abstainedChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Abstention on the mandate, government sources, ANSA, 26 Nov 2025 | The only abstention on the mandate. Wants detection orders issued by courts and limited to known material, and no searches by the EU Centre (June 2026). Voted for Chat Control 1.0 in July 2026. |
“Italy shares the need to strengthen the tools against online sexual abuse, but does not accept forms of mass monitoring of chats and personal data.”Italian government sources, ANSA, 26 November 2025, translated from Italian | ||||
| LVALatvia0.41 % of EU population | Supportssince 10 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Interior Ministry, Kaspars Abolins, LSM, 11 Sep 2025 | The Saeima's EU committee leaned slightly against on 24 September 2025 without changing the position. In June 2026 Riga wanted the widest scope: known and new material and grooming. |
“In our view this is a proposal to be supported, because it does not in any way provide for systematic, comprehensive scanning of people's private communications.”Interior Ministry, Kaspars Abolins, LSM, 11 September 2025, translated from Latvian | ||||
| LTULithuania0.64 % of EU population | Supportssince 12 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council working party minutes, 12 Sep and 12 Nov 2025, via netzpolitik.org | No public national statement found; two Lithuanian MEPs asked the government in autumn 2025 to state its position. Called the voluntary-only mandate an absolute minimum consensus (Nov 2025). |
“Lithuania continues to support the proposal; the compromise should be as ambitious as possible.”Council working party, 12 September 2025, as recorded in the German cable, translated | ||||
| LUXLuxembourg0.15 % of EU population | Againstsince 10 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Justice Minister Elisabeth Margue, L'essentiel, 11 Sep 2025 | Not in agreement with the mandatory text (Sept 2025). In June 2026 said the legal problems of the presidency's compromise are still not solved. |
“The measures are too intrusive. Client-side scanning could allow the surveillance of all private communications and carries the risk of general mass surveillance, including of people with no link to any offence.”Justice Minister Elisabeth Margue, answer to a parliamentary question reported by L'essentiel, 11 September 2025, translated from French | ||||
| MLTMalta0.13 % of EU population | Supportssince 17 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council minutes, 17 Jun 2026 (scope: known and new material and grooming), via netzpolitik.org | No public national statement found. Supported the voluntary-only mandate and, in June 2026, a positive reservation on the detection compromise. |
“Malta, like France, wants detection to cover known material, new material and grooming.”Council counsellors' meeting, 17 June 2026, as recorded in the German cable | ||||
| NLDNetherlands4.02 % of EU population | Againstsince 26 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025noChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Tweede Kamer motion instructing a vote against, adopted 25 Nov 2025 | Parliament ordered a no vote on the mandate; the cabinet had planned to abstain. Supports detection in public content and doubts targeted orders would ever be used (June 2026). On 18 Sep 2026 the minister told parliament there is “no room” to support proposals that make end-to-end encryption impossible, impose mandatory detection on all citizens’ private communications, or require detection in encrypted services that in practice only client-side scanning could carry out. |
“We are against it, and I will say so loud and clear.”Justice and Security Minister Foort van Oosten to the Tweede Kamer, 2 October 2025, translated from Dutch
| ||||
| POLPoland8.29 % of EU population | Againstsince 2 Jul 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025noChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Ministry of Digital Affairs, official statement, 16 Sep 2025 | Voted against the mandate in November 2025 and reaffirmed the line in July 2026, including the integrity of end-to-end encryption. In June 2026 accepted only targeted measures in non-public content. |
“Poland defends the privacy of internet users and opposes mass scanning of private correspondence.”Ministry of Digital Affairs, 16 September 2025, translated from Polish | ||||
| PRTPortugal2.38 % of EU population | Unclearsince 10 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Assembleia da Republica resolution 289/XVII, adopted 19 Sep 2025 | Parliament demands a judicial warrant for any detection. In Council the government called the mandatory text the right direction (Sept 2025) and is generally satisfied with the June 2026 compromise, minus grooming. |
“Other rights, namely the right to privacy, cannot be compressed disproportionately, unjustifiably or unnecessarily.”Ministry of Justice, Radio Renascenca, 29 September 2025, translated from Portuguese | ||||
| ROURomania4.21 % of EU population | Supportssince 26 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council working party minutes, 12 Nov 2025, via netzpolitik.org | No public national statement found. Supported the mandatory text (Sept 2025) and wanted detection negotiated now (June 2026). |
“Romania, Sweden and Croatia were clearly disappointed by the deletions but accepted the proposal because of the review clause.”Council working party, 12 November 2025, as recorded in the German cable, translated
| ||||
| SVKSlovakia1.21 % of EU population | Againstsince 26 Nov 2025 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025noChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Vote against the mandate, 26 Nov 2025 (CTK) | Voted against the mandate over encryption. In June 2026 wanted detection negotiated now while doubting that targeted orders would ever be used. |
“Non-selective scanning of communication is problematic; Slovakia cannot yet give a positive answer.”Council working party, 12 September 2025, as recorded in the German cable, translated | ||||
| SVNSlovenia0.47 % of EU population | Unclearsince 4 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Ministry of the Interior statement, 2 Oct 2025 (Zanima.me) | Against the Commission text under the previous government (Oct 2025). The government confirmed on 4 June 2026 has not stated a line; on 10 June 2026 its delegation entered a positive scrutiny reservation on the presidency compromise, which includes mandatory detection for public content. Reclassified from Against to Unclear on 9 September 2026. |
“Slovenia does not support the proposal in its current form. The reason is the disproportionate interference with privacy that the regulation provides for.”Ministry of the Interior, 2 October 2025, translated from Slovenian | ||||
| ESPSpain10.86 % of EU population | Supportssince 10 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Council working party minutes, 12 Nov 2025 (mandatory measures ‘still necessary’), via netzpolitik.org | Fully supported the mandatory text (Sept 2025) and proposed a duty to detect at least in public spaces (Nov 2025). Will drop grooming only if Parliament gives ground (June 2026). |
“The regulation obliges service providers to detect this content in encrypted communications.”Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska, ministry press release, 7 December 2022, translated from Spanish | ||||
| SWESweden2.34 % of EU population | Supportssince 10 Jun 2026 | Mandate, 26 Nov 2025yesChat Control 1.0, 23 Jul 2026yes | Justice Minister Gunnar Strommer, written answer to the Riksdag, 5 Feb 2025 | Welcomed the return of detection orders (Sept 2025), was clearly disappointed when they were dropped (Nov 2025) and wants the widest scope (June 2026). General election on 13 September 2026: until the next government states a position in the Council, the label stands. On 28 September 2026 Magdalena Andersson gave up her attempt to form a government; the Kristersson government stays in office meanwhile. |
“The government and a broad majority in the Riksdag are prepared to continue a negotiation at EU level along these lines.”Justice Minister Gunnar Strommer, 5 February 2025, translated from Swedish
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Suspects only, or everyone?
Who is on record for scanning only people under suspicion, and who for voluntary scanning of everyone. Counted on 3 October 2026.
The Parliament wants detection orders aimed at individuals or groups where there are “reasonable grounds of suspicion” (its position of 14 November 2023). The Council “wants to make permanent” the measure that lets companies scan their services voluntarily (Council, 26 November 2025). Below is what each government has said on that choice: in Council meetings, as recorded in German government reports published by netzpolitik.org; in one position paper reported by dpa; and, for Czechia and the Netherlands, in national documents linked from their pages. Where nothing is on record, the row says so.
Suspects only: 1 government, Poland, with 8.3% of the EU population.
Everyone, kept broad: 13 governments, 59.2%. All of them except Slovakia voted for the Council mandate that makes voluntary scanning permanent (Belgium’s vote is disputed, see its row above).
Limits, not suspects only: 4 governments, 16.6%: Italy, Austria, Finland and Luxembourg.
Not on record: 9 governments, 15.9%. Two of them chaired the Council this year: Cyprus until June, Ireland since July.
Of the nine governments on record against mandatory scanning, one is on record for scanning only suspects (Poland) and two for keeping voluntary scanning of everyone broad (Slovakia and Estonia); four ask for limits and two are not on record.
On the temporary rules, Chat Control 1.0, under which providers scan everyone’s messages voluntarily, the line falls elsewhere. On 26 June every government except Italy, Poland included, backed restoring them unchanged (German report of the meeting), and on 23 July 25 governments voted for them, with Hungary against and Belgium abstaining (see the table above). The presidency’s own summary of 10 September says that of the 14 governments that replied, “most Member States responding are in principle opposed to the concept of targeting detection to specific users”; it does not name them (11956/26).
| Government | What it said, and when (2026), with the source |
|---|---|
| Suspects only · 1 government · 8.3% | |
| Poland | Detection in private, non-public communication only when targeted; general monitoring to be avoided (17 June). Detection orders to be issued by courts (10 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 2 July, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Everyone, kept broad · 13 governments · 59.2% | |
| Germany | The widest possible scope, especially for voluntary detection (10 June). Restore the interim rules unchanged (26 June). Voluntary searching must not depend on prior permission (position paper reported by dpa, 29 September). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 12 June, netzpolitik.org, 2 July, dpa, 29 September. |
| France | A broad scope for voluntary detection, with no room for negotiation (10 June); known and new material and grooming (17 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 12 June, netzpolitik.org, 2 July. |
| Spain | No concessions on the scope of the interim rules (13 March). Source: netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Romania | No concessions on the scope of the interim rules (13 March). Said by the previous government. Source: netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Belgium | No concessions on the scope of the interim rules (13 March). Source: netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Sweden | No concessions on the scope (13 March); a wide scope: known and new material and grooming (10 June). Said by the outgoing government. Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Hungary | No concessions on the scope (13 March); a broad scope for voluntary detection, with France (10 June, after the change of government). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Slovakia | No concessions on the scope of the interim rules (13 March). Voted against the mandate, over encryption. Source: netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Croatia | A wide scope: known and new material and grooming; warned that providers would stop searching voluntarily and wait for orders (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Slovenia | No concessions on the scope of the interim rules (13 March). Source: netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Latvia | No concessions on the scope (13 March); a wide scope, and asked what targeted orders would add when the authorities would then have other tools (10 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Estonia | No concessions on the scope (13 March). Since then: narrow the scope to what technology can do, as grooming detection is too unreliable (10 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Malta | No concessions on the scope (13 March); known and new material and grooming (17 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 2 July. |
| Limits, not suspects only · 4 governments · 16.6% | |
| Italy | Detection orders from courts and for known material, new material only if limited to suspects; no proactive searches by the EU Centre (10 June). The only government against restoring the interim rules (26 June); voted for them on 23 July. Sources: netzpolitik.org, 12 June, netzpolitik.org, 2 July. |
| Austria | Critical of a broad scope and of detection orders (10 June); asked, like Italy, how detection limited to certain people would work (26 June). On 13 March it preferred the unchanged Council mandate on the interim rules. Sources: netzpolitik.org, 12 June, netzpolitik.org, 2 July, netzpolitik.org, 20 March. |
| Finland | No mandatory detection in non-public communication; voluntary detection within limits, looking for patterns, not content; no searches by the EU Centre (17 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 2 July. |
| Luxembourg | Critical of a broad scope; its known position unchanged and the legal problems not solved (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Not on record · 9 governments · 15.9% | |
| Netherlands | Asked whether the whole system would work; supports detection in public content; doubts targeted orders would ever be used (10 June). Minister: no room for mandatory detection of all citizens’ private messages (18 September). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 12 June, Netherlands page. |
| Czechia | The government says it has no position. Parliament’s EU committee rejects general content detection and backs targeted, judicially reviewable and voluntary tools (17 September). Source: Czechia page. |
| Portugal | Generally satisfied with the presidency’s proposal; no grooming in the scope (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Greece | A scrutiny reservation, called positive (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Bulgaria | Preferred the unchanged mandate on the interim rules but would go with the majority (13 March); a scrutiny reservation (10 June). Sources: netzpolitik.org, 20 March, netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Denmark | Asked why the interim rules could not simply be copied over (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Ireland | Has chaired the Council since 1 July 2026. Source: Council. |
| Lithuania | A scrutiny reservation, called positive (10 June). Source: netzpolitik.org, 12 June. |
| Cyprus | Chaired the Council from January to June 2026. Source: Council. |
How to read this. The reports record what a delegation said in a closed meeting, not a vote, and most statements date from March to June 2026. Sweden, Romania and Latvia are forming new governments. “Suspects only” means a government said detection in private messages must be limited to suspects; “everyone, kept broad” means it refused to narrow voluntary scanning or asked for the widest scope for it; “limits” means it asked for restrictions without asking for suspects only. Spain and Portugal also appear in 11956/26 for how their police work at home: according to Patrick Breyer (28 September), Spain uses court orders against specific users where there are objective signs of crime, and Portugal targets people with relevant prior convictions. That is national practice, not a position in these talks. If a row is wrong, tell us and it is fixed within 24 hours.
How their MEPs voted
9 July 2026, the vote that let Chat Control 1.0 return.
Parliament voted on a motion to reject the Council’s text. A yes vote meant no to voluntary scanning; 361 votes were needed and 314 were cast, so the text passed. The table shows each country’s MEPs: for rejection, against rejection, abstained, and did not vote. Governments and parliaments do not always agree, which is the point of showing both.
| Country | For rejection | Against | Abstained | Did not vote | Share of MEPs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 | |
| Belgium | 10 | 7 | 1 | 4 | |
| Bulgaria | 8 | 5 | 0 | 4 | |
| Croatia | 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 | |
| Cyprus | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | |
| Czechia | 12 | 4 | 0 | 5 | |
| Denmark | 11 | 3 | 1 | 0 | |
| Estonia | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| Finland | 6 | 8 | 0 | 1 | |
| France | 44 | 16 | 8 | 13 | |
| Germany | 54 | 35 | 1 | 6 | |
| Greece | 6 | 9 | 0 | 6 | |
| Hungary | 1 | 13 | 1 | 6 | |
| Ireland | 1 | 11 | 0 | 2 | |
| Italy | 39 | 13 | 0 | 24 | |
| Latvia | 3 | 5 | 0 | 1 | |
| Lithuania | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | |
| Luxembourg | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | |
| Malta | 3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | |
| Netherlands | 22 | 5 | 0 | 4 | |
| Poland | 12 | 33 | 0 | 8 | |
| Portugal | 7 | 12 | 0 | 2 | |
| Romania | 8 | 19 | 0 | 6 | |
| Slovakia | 11 | 1 | 0 | 3 | |
| Slovenia | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | |
| Spain | 16 | 37 | 0 | 7 | |
| Sweden | 6 | 12 | 3 | 0 | |
| All 27 | 314 | 276 | 17 | 112 |
Source: roll-call vote 195775 as published by the European Parliament and compiled by HowTheyVote.eu. Green is for rejection, amber against, grey abstained; the empty part of the bar is MEPs who did not vote.
Method
What the labels mean and where the numbers come from.
Against means the government has said publicly, or voted in Council, that it will not accept mandatory or suspicionless scanning of private communication. Several of these governments, Germany above all, support the widest possible scope for voluntary scanning; that is in the note. Supports means the government backed the Danish presidency’s text with detection orders in September 2025, or argues in Council for the widest scanning scope, including grooming detection or scanning inside encrypted services. Unclear means the government’s own statements and its Council conduct do not add up to one position.
The receipt is the strongest public document we found: a government or ministry statement, a parliamentary decision, or a vote record. Where no public national statement exists, the row rests on the Council’s internal minutes, which the German mission cables to Berlin and netzpolitik.org publishes; the note says so. We prefer primary documents and link to reporting only when it quotes an official on the record.
Council votes need a qualified majority: 15 member states representing at least 65 % of the EU population. Four member states with more than 35 % of the population can block. The population shares are the Council’s own 2026 figures, taken from the voting result of 23 July 2026. Coreper, where the mandate was adopted on 26 November 2025, does not publish votes; the split we show was reported the same day from diplomatic sources by the Czech news agency CTK and matches the Czech interior minister’s own account.
What the arithmetic is for. The blocking-minority sums on this page describe one future decision: the Council’s vote on whatever the trilogues produce, first in the Permanent Representatives Committee and then formally, on a date not yet known. The Council does not vote during the trilogues. It adopted its negotiating mandate on 26 November 2025 by qualified majority, and four of the nine governments listed here as Against voted for that voluntary-only text while one abstained, which is why positions and votes are recorded in separate columns. The sums assume that governments would vote on a text with mandatory detection as they have spoken about mandatory detection. They are not a forecast of how any government will weigh a package, and they are not a count of votes on any trilogue text. Clarified on 11 September 2026 after a reader’s objection. To try other combinations, use the blocking minority calculator; why counts of the governments against differ is set out in a record note.
Positions move. Eight governments changed between the mandate and today: Czechia, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Denmark, Malta and Slovenia. Ireland now holds the presidency. When a government changes its line, the row changes and the changelog records it.
When a government changes. A position stated by one government stands for its successor until the new government confirms it, changes it, or acts against it in Council. The first document from a new government re-dates the row: if it carries the same label, the label stays and the date moves to that document, as with Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Denmark in June 2026; if it points the other way, the row goes to Unclear from the change of government until the government speaks, as with Slovenia on 9 September 2026. Bulgaria’s row still rests on documents from before its change of government on 8 May 2026; the new government’s delegation has entered a scrutiny reservation and nothing more. A public statement outranks a Council minute, and a recorded vote outranks both: a minute can carry a label when nothing else exists and it points one way, and the receipt says so, but it cannot on its own overturn a statement.
Changelog
Every edit to a position or a vote.
- 10 Oct 2026Added a blocking minority calculator that applies the Council’s voting rules to these 27 records, and a record note on why counts of the governments against differ: “How many governments oppose Chat Control? It depends on the question”. No position changes.
- 10 Oct 2026Correction. The method said that four member states with at least 35 % of the population can block. The rule is more than 35 %: a qualified majority needs governments with at least 65 % of the population, so exactly 35 % against does not block (Council of the EU, “Qualified majority”). The source line for the ČTK report on the mandate vote now gives both dates: ČTK reported the vote on 26 November 2025, and the copy on Denik.cz is dated 27 November. No figure changes.
- 5 Oct 2026Added a record note on the count of 3 October: “Only one of 27 governments is on record for scanning suspects only”. No position label changed.
- 3 Oct 2026Added “Suspects only, or everyone?”: who is on record for scanning only people under suspicion and who for voluntary scanning of everyone, each row with its source. No position label changed. Fixed: since 29 September a stray tag had broken the page below the main table, so the button that opens the MEP votes did not work.
- 2 Oct 2026Correction. The entry for 30 September said that neither the Council nor the Parliament had published an outcome. The Parliament had: it published its rapporteur’s statement on 30 September, which this page missed until 2 October. Source: European Parliament, 30 September 2026.
- 2 Oct 2026Event, no change of position. The Parliament’s statement covers the tasks of the EU Centre and does not mention detection orders; the agreement in principle on detection orders for public content is now attributed to the reports that carry it, Agence Europe, MLex and Patrick Breyer, and netzpolitik.org reports agreement only on the Centre. The Council’s main results of the justice ministers’ meeting on 2 October do not mention the regulation. Positions on this page change only with a document; none has changed. Source: netzpolitik.org, 1 October 2026; Council of the EU, 2 October 2026.
- 1 Oct 2026Event, no change of position. The Parliament’s rapporteur, Javier Zarzalejos, welcomed on 30 September the agreement on the tasks of the EU Centre; Agence Europe reports an agreement in principle on detection orders for large platforms covering public content, and that no date is confirmed for the next trilogue. Private messages remain unresolved. Positions on this page change only with a document; none has changed. Source: Agence Europe, 1 October 2026.
- 30 Sep 2026Event, no change of position. Former MEP Patrick Breyer reported that the trilogue of 29 September ended without agreement on scanning private messages, with a preliminary agreement on publicly accessible content, and that the next round is expected in November. The Council and the Parliament have not published an outcome. Corrected on 2 October: the Parliament had published its rapporteur’s statement that day. Positions on this page change only with a document; none has changed. Source: Patrick Breyer, 30 September 2026.
- 30 Sep 2026Update, no change of position. The sixth trilogue was held on 29 September, according to the presidency’s overview of that day, Council document 13051/26; its outcome has not been published. The status text no longer describes it as upcoming.
- 11 Sep 2026Clarification, no change of position. After a reader’s objection, the Status text and the Method section now say what the blocking-minority sums are for: the Council’s future vote on the outcome of the trilogues, on a date not yet set, assuming governments vote as they have spoken. The Council does not vote in the trilogues. The same clarification was added to the article of 8 September as a dated update.
- 10 Sep 2026Method, no change of position. The Method section now states the rule for changes of government: a position stands for the successor until the new government confirms it, changes it or acts against it in Council; the first document from a new government re-dates the row, and a contrary signal sends it to Unclear, as with Slovenia. Bulgaria’s timeline gains the scrutiny reservation of 10 June 2026; its label still rests on documents from before the change of government of 8 May 2026.
- 9 Sep 2026Reclassification. Slovenia moves from Against to Unclear: its recorded statement of 2 October 2025 predates the government confirmed on 4 June 2026, which has not stated a position and whose delegation entered a positive scrutiny reservation on the presidency compromise on 10 June 2026 (Council minutes via netzpolitik.org). The count changes from 10 against (33.3 %) to 9 against (32.9 %), the gap to a blocking minority from 1.7 to 2.1 points, and the unclear group grows to three (Belgium, Portugal, Slovenia). The three governments that can close the gap are unchanged. The two documents behind the change are set out in a record note of 10 September 2026. Also today: the date of the sixth trilogue, 29 September, now rests on the presidency’s note to delegations of 7 July 2026, Council document 11501/26, rather than on leaked minutes alone.
- 9 Sep 2026Structure, and one correction. Each of the 27 governments now has its own page with the quote, the receipt, both Council votes, the 9 July 2026 vote of its MEPs and a dated timeline; the figures and the table on this page are computed from those 27 records. Netherlands: the statement of 2 October 2025 was made by Foort van Oosten as Minister of Justice and Security, not as State Secretary, as this page said until today. No country position changed. Who decides in each of the 27 member states, the minister, the ministry, the permanent representation and where documented the parliament, is now named on the country pages, with sources.
- 8 Sep 2026Refinement, not a correction. The summary said a blocking minority rested on Germany alone. It rests on three governments. The ten opponents are 1.7 points short of the 35 % threshold, and Belgium (2.63 %) or Portugal (2.38 %) would each close that gap on their own, as Germany would. No country position changed.
- 7 Sep 2026Correction. Germany moved from Against to Conditional. Its public line of 8 October 2025 stands, but the negotiating instruction reported from Council documents in June 2026 does not oppose mandatory detection where it supplements voluntary scanning, so counting Germany as against overstated the record. The count changes from 11 against (51.8 % of the population) to 10 against (33.3 %) plus one conditional. A blocking minority now depends on Germany.
- 5 Sep 2026Page published with the state of play as of 5 September 2026: 11 against, 14 supporting, 2 unclear. Council votes of 26 November 2025 and 23 July 2026 and the Parliament vote of 9 July 2026 added.
Sources
Every document this page rests on, in one list.
- Council voting result 12382/26, Regulation (EU) 2026/1881Council of the EU, 10 Aug 2026, written procedure of 23 Jul 2026, with the statement by France
- Council reaches position on the CSA regulationCouncil press release, 26 Nov 2025
- Council backs the text; Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and the Netherlands against, Italy abstainsČTK report of 26 Nov 2025, Denik.cz copy dated 27 Nov 2025
- Council moves to reinstate the interim measureCouncil press release, 2 Jul 2026
- Parliament roll-call vote 195775HowTheyVote.eu, 9 Jul 2026
- Council working party minutes of 12 Sep 2025netzpolitik.org, 23 Sep 2025
- Council working party minutes of 12 Nov 2025netzpolitik.org, 18 Nov 2025
- Council minutes of 21 May and 10 Jun 2026netzpolitik.org, 12 Jun 2026
- Council minutes of 17, 26 and 30 Jun 2026netzpolitik.org, 2 Jul 2026
- German government: suspicionless chat control is taboonetzpolitik.org, 8 Oct 2025
- Denmark drops detection ordersnetzpolitik.org, 31 Oct 2025
- Verlängerung der Ausnahmeregelung: Rat ließ Chatkontrolle-Verhandlungen sehenden Auges scheiternnetzpolitik.org, 20 Mar 2026, with the German government’s reports of the meetings of 10 and 13 March 2026
- Child sexual abuse online: effective measures, no mass surveillanceEuropean Parliament press release, 14 Nov 2023, the Parliament’s position
- Streit um Chatkontrolle: Deutschland will Suchbefugnisse nicht einschränkenbeck-aktuell, 29 Sep 2026, dpa report on the German government’s position paper
- Chatkontrolle: EU-Regierungen wollen „Suchpläne“ zur dauerhaften Legalisierung von Massenscans im finalen Trilog-Showdown durchsetzenPatrick Breyer, 28 Sep 2026, on Council documents 11956/26 and 13158/26
- List of presidencies of the Council of the European UnionCouncil of the EU: Cyprus January to June 2026, Ireland July to December 2026
- fightchatcontrol.euCampaign site with a simpler map and a tool to write to MEPs; our categories differ from theirs
National documents for each country are linked in the table under Receipt and Quote and more. Want to write to your government? The Council’s member-state pages list every permanent representation; fightchatcontrol.eu has a tool for MEPs.
Brussels Record, “Where the 27 governments stand on Chat Control”, checked 5 September 2026, https://brusselsrecord.com/chat-control-governments/